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CORPORATE PAYOUTS AND THE TAX PRICE OF CORPORATE RETENTIONS:
EVIDENCE FROM THE UNDISTRIBUTED PROFITS TAX OF 1936-1938
ABSTRACT
Many prov1s10ns of the U.S. tax code affect corporate decisions to
pay ~ut or retain earnings. Most studies of these effects have examined
the effects of dividend and capital gains taxes on payouts. Relatively
few studies have considered the effects of corporate taxes on retentions.
In the early 1900s, the United States experimented with several corporate
taxes on retentions. These taxes increased the price of corporate
retentions, thereby encouraging corporate payouts. This paper studies
the response of corporations to the most significant of these experiments
the Undistributed Profits Tax of 1936-1938.
While the U.S. no longer directly taxes corporate retentions, our
study provides empirical results relevant to two recent policy debates.
First, to the extent that corporate payouts did respond significantly to
a change in the cOrporate price of retentions, we can learn more about
the implicit prices corporations place on internal funds. These esti-
mates enable us better understand the effects of government policies
designed to encourage corporate reinvestment. Second, our study provides
evidence relevant to several recent proposals designed to resolve mana-
gerial agency problems. These proposals require managers to payout
their "free" cash flows as a way of cOlIIDitting not to waste financial
capital. The Undistributed Profits Tax of 1936-1938 had a similar goal.
Its maximum marginal tax rate of 27 percent on corporate retentions gave
managers strong incentives ~payout retained earnings.
We study the effects of the Undistributed Profits Tax on corporate
payouts using a panel data set on 26 large petroleum companies. These
data have a number of advantages, not the least of which is the relative
homogeneity of petroleum firms' investment opportunities. We find that
on average corporate payout policies did respond significantly to the
surtax in 1936, the first year of the tax. There was much less of a
response in 1937, and practically none in the last year, 1938. The
smaller payouts in 1937 and 1938 suggest that managers were able to find
margins other than dividends through which they could reduce their tax
burden. These other margins included the short-term manipulation of
expenses and delays in recognizing revenues. These responses suggest
that managers place a relatively high valuation on internal versus
external funds. They also suggest that proposals that would require
managers to payout free cash flows must resolve an important incentive
problem -- how to get managers to reveal fully what cash flows are
"free." Finally, our results document the importance of recognizing
behavioral responses to taxes. That is, firms may respond to changes in
relative tax prices by finding other margins by which they can reduce
their tax burdens.
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